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ABSTRACT
Several public health interest groups in the United States
have recently called for equalization of the federal tax on a unit
of alcohol in beer, in wine and in spirits. This paper provides
some new empirical evidence of what effect alcohol tax
differentials have on total alcohol consumption. The data indicate
that the greatest decrease in alcohol consumption results from an
increase in spirits taxes, followed by beer taxes and then wine
taxes. This suggests that the existing generally accepted taxation
policy of placing the highest tax on spirits, a lower tax on beer,
and the lowest tax on wine, results in the greatest reduction in
total alcohol consumption.
Henry Saffer
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I. Introduction
Many countries, including the United States, have adopted
taxation and other regulatory policies which favor beer and wine
over spirits. The justification for these policies has been the
belief that there are differential physiological effects and public
health effects associated with each beverage.' Some support for
this belief is provided by the biomedical literature. The Brewers
Association of Canada (1986) and the Wine Institute of California
(1986) review a number of medical studies of the physiological
effects of beer, wine, and spirits. These medical studies indicate
that the consumption of alcohol in the form of beer or wine results
in a slower increase in blood alcohol concentration, a lower
maximum blood alcohol concentration, and a faster decrease in blood
alcohol concentration, than when the same amount Of alcohol is
consumed in the form of spirits.2
In the United States, alcohol tax differentials were increased
in 1985. The change was the result of an increase in the federal
excise tax on spirits.The tax increase precipitated a public
1 A second justification for these policies is based on the
relative production costs of each beverage. A unit of alcohol is
relatively cheaper to produce in the form of spirits than it is in
the form of beer or wine. Excise tax differentials thus tend to
equate the purchase price of a unit of alcohol in each of the three
beverages.
2 The Wine Institute review explains that beer and wine
produce lower blood alcohol levels because of the nutrients found
in these beverages. These nutrients stimulate a digestive process
which breaks down alcohol and thus limits the amount of alcohol
which can be absorbed into the blood stream. There is much less
evidence of differential physiological effects of beer and wine.2
service campaign by the distilling industry to promote the concept
of equivalence. The equivalence concept states that a 1.25 ounce
shot of whiskey, a 12 ounce can of beer, and a five ounce glass of
wine all have the same alcohol content. The implication of this
campaign was that because each serving has the same alcohol
content, each alcoholic beverage has the same potential for adverse
public health consequences. This suggests that the alcohol, in
each alcoholic beverage, should receive the same tax treatment.
This equivalence campaign was also supported by several
alcohol oriented public interest groups. One of these interest
groups circulated a petition to academic economists in support of
an increase in all alcohol taxes and an equalization of the tax on
alcohol in each of the three alcoholic beverages. This petition
was signed by 80 economists including three Nobel laureates.
The central issue in the debate over equalizing alcohol tax
differentials is the degree of beverage substitutability. While
beer, wine and spirits all contain alcohol these three beverages
are not perfect substitutes. If the three beverages are strongly
substitutable, a increase in one tax, or disproportionate increases
in all taxes, will induce some consumers to shift to the relatively
less expensive beverage. Substitution of beverages will limit the
reduction in alcohol consumption which results from the increase
in taxes. ldternatively, if the three alcoholic beverages are only
weakly substitutable then a change in the tax on one beverage would
have only a minor effect on the consumption mix.3
While there are a priori reasons to assume substitutability
between the three beverages, a review of the empirical literature
by Ornstein and Levy(1983)findslittle evidence of
substitutability. Un (1986), however, reports evidence that the
three alcoholic beverages are substitutable.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new empirical test
of the effect that alcohol tax differentials have on total alcohol
consumption. The focus on total alcohol consumption rather than
beer, wine and spirits is important for two reasons. First,
alcohol related public health problems are a function of total
alcohol consumption rather than specific beverage consumption.
Second, estimation of a total alcohol demand function reduces the
number of estimated parameters that must conform to a priori
constraints imposed by demand theory.
II. Empirical Framework
Consumer demand theory provides the conceptual framework for
the empirical models.The demand for alcohol is derived by
assuming that an individual's utility depends on the consumption
of alcohol, the consumption of other goods, and taste. Maximizing
this utility function subject to a budget constraint yields the
following demand curve for alcohol:
(1) A = + + Z1a1+p
The demand for alcohol (A) is defined as a function of the price
of alcohol (P), income (I), and a vector of other factors (Z1).4
The price of alcohol can be defined as a function of beer, wine and
spirits taxes (tb, t4, ta), other factors (Z2) as follows.
(2)
This price function can be substituted for price in the demand
curve. The result in a reduced form demand curve which shows that
alcohol consumption is a function of taxes, income and other
factors:
(3) A=7r,t+1rt+r,t,+w1I+Z3a3+M3
In these three equations fi,8,and r are coefficients, a are
coefficient vectors and the jsvaluesare error tens. The reduced
form alcohol demand equation can be aggregated across individuals
to yield an empirically estimatable equation.
An increase in any one of the beverage taxes results in two
effects.The first effect, called the own—price effect, is a
reduction in consumption of that beverage. Demand theory requires
a negative own—price effect. The second effect, called a cross—
price effect, is a change consumption of another beverage. Demand
theory does not provide any a priori conclusions about the
direction or magnitude of cross-price effects. If an increase in
any one of the taxes results in an increase in consumption of
another beverage then the two beverages are substitutes. The own—
price effect causes a reduction in total alcohol consumption.
However, cross—price effects can increase alcohol consumption. The
net effect on total alcohol consumption of an increase in any one
alcohol tax, or of a change in alcohol tax differentials, is thus
ambiguous.5
III. Data
The data set used in this study is a time series of cross
sections consisting of 14 countries for the years 1970 through
1983.Data from 14 countries are used since the variation in
taxation policies is greater across countries than within any
single country.For example, in the United States, federal tax
differentials between beer, wine and spirits were constant from
1951 to 1985. There is, however, considerable variation in alcohol
tax differentials across countries. The increased variation in tax
differentials available from an international data set improves the
precision of the empirical tests. The 14 countries used in this
study are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) .TheOECD countries were chosen because they
have attempted to maintain a data base of comparable economic and
social data since 1960. The member countries of the OECD are also
the most developed free market countries in the world. The data
set was limited to 14 countries because of the availability of
data. The data set begins with 1970 and ends in 1983. Table 1
contains summary definitions and mean values for all the variables.
The dependent variable used in the regressions is per capita
annual consumption of pure alcohol in liters. These data come from
the International Survey of Alcohol Beverage Control polices
published by the Brewers Association of Canada (BAC). The variable
is computed by adding together the per capita consumption of pure
alcohol in beer, wine and spirits.The data are based on6
different assumptions, by year and country, about the percent of
alcohol in each beverage.
There are three methods of taxing alcohol. These are: (1)
national alcohol taxes, (2) local alcohol taxes, and (3) value
added or sales taxes which are not specific to alcohol.Each
country included in this study uses national alcohol taxes and
several countries also use local and value added or sales taxes.
Only the national tax data is available on a consistent and
historical basis across countries.However, national alcohol
taxes, which are usually excise taxes, are the largest of the three
taxes. National alcohol taxes are also more important than value
added and sales taxes because they are alcohol specific.3
The tax data used in the regressions are national taxes per
liter of pure alcohol. The national alcohol tax data were divided
by the gross domestic product deflator and the purchasing power
Local alcohol taxes are generally lower than national taxes
and tend to reflect the pattern of national taxes. The tax
differentials are thus not seriously affected by local taxes. Value
added and sales taxes are a percentage of price and thus tend to
tax the alcohol in beer and wine at a higher rate than spirits.
This tends to reduce the size of the actual total tax differential
on spirits.7
parity.4 The data come from the BACInternationalSurvey of Alcohol
Beverage Control Polices.
Real income was computed by first dividing gross domestic
product by population. This was then divided by the gross domestic
product deflator and the purchasing power parity. The data are in
thousands of U.S. dollars and come from the OECD National Accounts.
The regressions also include a measure of health awareness.
This variable is the general mortality rate.Higher mortality
rates are associated with lower levels of demand or supply of
health services. This variable should have a positive relationship
with alcohol demand. The variable is measured as total mortality
from all causes divided by population in thousands. The data come
from the UN Demographic Yearbook.
A dichotomous spirits advertising ban variable is included in
the alcohol demand equation. This variable is equal to one if a
country has a voluntary or mandatory ban on broadcast advertising
of spirits and is otherwise equal to zero.These data come
primarily from the International Survey of Alcohol Beverage Control
Polices.
Taxes and income are reported in units of national currency
and must be standardized using purchasing power parities. The OECD
reports purchasing power parities for the member countries based
on 1980 survey data. Although reliability diminishes with distance
from the sample year, purchasing power parities can be estimated
for earlier years using inflation rates. The purchasing power
parity converts taxes and income to U. S. dollars. Taxes and income
are also adjusted for inflation using the gross domestic product
deflator with the base year of 1975.8
The disadvantage of an international data set is the
difficulty in measuring the other factors effecting alcohol
consumption. For example, cultural differences may effect alcohol
consumption across countries even after observable phenomena are
controlled.Quantitative information measuring all the factors
influencing alcohol consumption across countries does not exist.
The omission of these factors could result in biased estimates of
the effects of alcohol taxes.
A fixed effects model is one method of approximating the
influence of these omitted factors. Fixed effects models use a
series of country dummy variables which, according to Johnston
(1984) ,canaccount for differences in country specific unobserved
factors.These fixed effects models also include time dummy
variables which account for time trends in the dependent variables.
Cook and Tauchen (1982) also use fixed effects models to estimate
the effects of taxes and income on liquor consumption and liver
cirrhosis mortality rates.
IV.Results
The results from four fixed effects models are summarized in
table 2. Each model includes 13 country dummies and 13 time dummy
variables for the years 1970 to 1982.These dummy variables
account for excluded country and time specific factors which effect
The dependent variable was transformed into the natural
logarithm of alcohol consumption. this functional form is often
used in demand studies. Because of aggregation, these regressions
are weighted by n12, where n is the population of the country.9
the dependent variable. Each model uses an alternative combination
of the independent variables which provides a test for
specification bias.The three taxes are included in all four
models.
The results presented in table 2 show that beer taxes and
spirits taxes have a significant negative effect on total alcohol
consumption. Wine taxes, however, have no significant effect on
total alcohol consumption. The beer tax coefficient indicates that
if beer taxes were increased, the increase in alcohol consumption
in the form of wine and spirits is insufficient to. offset the
decrease in alcohol consumption in the form of beer. The spirits
tax coefficient indicates that if spirits taxes were increased, the
increase in alcohol consumption in the form of beer and wine is
also insufficient to offset the decrease in alcohol consumption in
the form of spirits. The wine tax coefficient indicates that if
wine taxes were increased, the increase in alcohol consumption in
the form of beer and spirits is sufficient to offset the decrease
in alcohol consumption in the form of wine.
These results suggest that wine is substitutable with beer and
spirits, but beer and spirits are only weakly substitutable with
each other. A change in wine taxes would cause substitution to
beer and spirits. Symmetry requires that an increase in beer or
spirits taxes cause substitution to wine.These substitution
effects are not sufficient to offset the own—price effects. An
increase in beer or spirits taxes would not, however result in much
substitution between these beverages.10
Real income is also included in three specifications. Real
income has no a priori expectation since an increase in income can
be expected to increase the demand for both alcohol and health.
The increased demand for health could reduce the demand for
alcohol. Real income is positive and significant in the alcohol
demand equations. These results show that an increase in income
increases per capita alcohol consumption.
The remaining independent variables are significant and
conform to a priori expectations. The general mortality rate is
inversely related to health awareness. The positive coefficient
of general mortality suggests that alcohol demand is lower where
health awareness is higher.The advertising ban variable is
negative and significant suggesting that banning spirits
advertisements reduces alcohol demand.
V. Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical test of the effects of
alcohol tax differentials on alcohol consumption. Since there is
little variation in tax differentials over time in individual
countries, data from 14 countries over a period of 14 years were
eniployed in the empirical models. All of the regression models
estimated are fixed effects models which account for unobservable
influences which vary by country and time.
The elasticity of total alcohol consumption with respect to
beer taxes is estimated to be .071 and for spirits •taxes is
estimated to be .104.Wine taxes have no significant effect on11
total alcohol consumption. These elasticities were estimated using
the empirical model which includes all the independent variables.
The elasticities indicate that the greatest decrease in alcohol
consumption results from an increase in spirits taxes. A given
percentage increase in beer taxes will reduce alcohol consumption
by about 70 percent as much as the same percentage increase in
spirits taxes. Wine tax increases have no effect on total alcohol
consumption. This suggests that the existing generally accepted
taxation policy of placing the highest tax on spirits, a lower tax
on beer, and the lowest tax on wine, results in the greatest
reduction in total alcohol consumption.12
Table 1
Definitions and Means of Variables
variable Definition and Mean
Per Capita Consumption in liters per capita of pure
Consumption alcohol from beer, wine and spirits. p=8.95.
of Pure
Alcohol
Beer Tax National tax on a liter of pure alcohol in the
form of beer divided by GDP deflator and
converted to U.s. dollars by dividing by the
purchasing power parity. p=5.lO.
Wine Tax National tax on a liter of pure alcohol in the
form of wine divided by GDP deflator and
converted to U.s. dollars by dividing by the
purchasing power parity. p=4.29.
Spirits Tax National tax on a liter of pure alcohol in the
form of spirits divided by GDP deflator and
converted to U.s. dollars by dividing by the
purchasing power parity. =l2.96.
Real Income National income divided by GDP deflator and
converted to thousands of U.S. dollars by
dividing by the Purchasing Power Parity.
i=5.84.
General Mortality from all causes, per thousand
Mortality population. M=10•°6•
Rate
Advertising A dichotomous variable is equal to one if a
Ban country has a ban on broadcast advertising of
spirits, and is equal to zero otherwise.
All data are for the 14 countries for the years 1970 through 1983.
The 14 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,






































P—Squared .98 .98 .98 .98
* Thet-ratios are in parentheses.Allequations include dummy variables for13 countries and the years 1970 through 1982, and an
intercept.14
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